Resolving distributional conflicts between generations
Working paper
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162942Utgivelsesdato
2002-05Metadata
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Sammendrag
We describe a new approach to the problem of resolving
distributional conflicts between an infinite and countable number of generations.
We impose conditions on the social preferences that capture
the following idea: If indifference or preference holds between truncated
paths for infinitely many truncating times, then indifference or preference
holds also between the untruncated infinite paths. In this framework
we show (1) how such conditions illustrate the problem of combining
Strong Pareto and impartiality in an intergenerational setting, and
(2) how equity conditions well-known from the finite setting can be used to characterize different versions of leximin and utilitarianism.
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of EconomicsSerie
Discussion paper2002:11