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Merger profitability in unionized oligopoly

Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Straume, Odd Rune; Sørgard, Lars
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162982
Date
2000-05
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [578]
Abstract
We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour

and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot

and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find

that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model

with exogenous wages. In contrast to the received literature, we

find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than

being an outsider. For firm-specific unions, on the other hand, results are reversed.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2000:9

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