dc.contributor.author | Lommerud, Kjell Erik | |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | |
dc.contributor.author | Sørgard, Lars | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-08-15T10:51:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-08-15T10:51:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2000-05 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162982 | |
dc.description.abstract | We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour
and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot
and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find
that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model
with exogenous wages. In contrast to the received literature, we
find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than
being an outsider. For firm-specific unions, on the other hand, results are reversed. | en |
dc.format.extent | 317854 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2000:9 | en |
dc.subject | merger profitability | en |
dc.subject | trade unions | en |
dc.subject | endogenous wages | en |
dc.title | Merger profitability in unionized oligopoly | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |