Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorLommerud, Kjell Erik
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-15T10:51:17Z
dc.date.available2006-08-15T10:51:17Z
dc.date.issued2000-05
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162982
dc.description.abstractWe examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For firm-specific unions, on the other hand, results are reversed.en
dc.format.extent317854 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2000:9en
dc.subjectmerger profitabilityen
dc.subjecttrade unionsen
dc.subjectendogenous wagesen
dc.titleMerger profitability in unionized oligopolyen
dc.typeWorking paperen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record