Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorSelvik, Kjetil
dc.contributor.authorBjorvatn, Kjetil
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-20T11:00:36Z
dc.date.available2007-06-20T11:00:36Z
dc.date.issued2007-02
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163314
dc.description.abstractEmpirical evidence shows that countries richly endowed with natural resources like oil and gas tend to have slower economic growth than resource poor countries. The present paper focuses on rentseeking as a source of the “resource curse”, using Iran as a case in point. Iran is an interesting case, both because it is a rentier economy in the oil rich Middle East, and because its political system is highly factionalized. The distortions from the factionalized political system are threefold. First, resources are wasted in the competition for rents. Second, the lack of property rights protection results in less (private) investment at the aggregate level. Third, imbalances in the distribution of political power between groups lead to a distortion in the allocation of investment funds.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007:8en
dc.subjectresource curseen
dc.subjectfactionalizationen
dc.subjectrent seekingen
dc.subjectoil revenuesen
dc.subjectIranen
dc.titleDestructive competition : factionalism and rent-seeking in Iranen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record