dc.contributor.author | Ellingsen, Tore | |
dc.contributor.author | Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-14T13:04:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-14T13:04:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012-03 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163346 | |
dc.description.abstract | Talented managers may leave the firm in order to work elsewhere. Focusing on the
portability of managers' resources, we develop a model in which managerial compensation
is designed to prevent inefficient departure. The model rationalizes the widespread use of
fl at salaries in combination with performance-vesting stock options and is consistent with
observed differences in compensation contracts across individuals, firms, industries, and
countries. | no_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics | no_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper;8/2012 | |
dc.title | Paying for staying : managerial contracts and the retention motive | no_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | no_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 | no_NO |