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Anatomy of cartel contracts

Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163424
Date
2012-12
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [586]
Abstract
We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing

cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with

instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels

use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization.

These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal

with instability. Simplifying, we find that large cartels agree on prices, cartels in homogenous

goods industries allocate markets, and small cartels avoid competition

through specialization.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper;25/2012

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