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dc.contributor.authorHyytinen, Ari
dc.contributor.authorSteen, Frode
dc.contributor.authorToivanen, Otto
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-13T11:24:46Z
dc.date.available2013-03-13T11:24:46Z
dc.date.issued2012-12
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163424
dc.description.abstractWe study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability. Simplifying, we find that large cartels agree on prices, cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets, and small cartels avoid competition through specialization.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics, Department of Economicsno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;25/2012
dc.subjectcartelsno_NO
dc.subjectcontractsno_NO
dc.subjectantitrustno_NO
dc.subjectcompetition policyno_NO
dc.subjectindustry heterogeneityno_NO
dc.titleAnatomy of cartel contractsno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212no_NO


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