Blar i Discussion papers (FOR) på forfatter "Olsen, Trond E."

Viser treff 1-20 av 27

    • Access regulation and cross-border mergers : is international coordination beneficial? 

      Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Olsen, Trond E.; Straume, Odd Rune (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-04)
      The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic ...

    • Balanced scorecards: a relational contract approach 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;3/20, Working paper, 2020-05-08)
      Reward systems based on balanced scorecards typically connect pay to an index, i.e. a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. However, there is no formal incentive model that actually describe this kind of index ...

    • Career concerns, monetary incentives and job design 

      Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-12)
      We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent career concerns are determined by the outside market. We show that the principal might want ...

    • Career concerns, multiple tasks, and short-term contracts 

      Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-12)
      We study optimal incentive contracts when commitments are limited, and agents have multiple tasks and career concerns. The agent career concerns are determined by the outside market. We show that the optimal compensation ...

    • Common agency with outside options : the case of international taxation of an MNE 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1999)

    • Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)
      The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ...

    • Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge 

      Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;05/13, Working paper, 2013-05)
      The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is how- ever hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper ...

    • Distorted performance measures and dynamic incentives 

      Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-12)
      Incentive contracts must typically be based on performance measures that do not exactly match agents' true contribution to principals' objectives. Such misalignment may impose difficulties for effective incentive design. ...

    • Endogenous verifiability in relational contracting 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-11)
      We analyze a repeated principal-agent trust game where the principal makes a specific investment by paying the agent up-front, expecting an agreed upon quality level in return. The verifiability of the agent’s action is ...

    • Incentive provision when contracting is costly 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-08)
      We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. We show that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot ...

    • International competition for R&D investments 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2000-02)
      Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the R&D investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments potentially confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm contributes to local welfare ...

    • Multinationals, regulatory competition and outside options 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-12)
      Lower barriers to entry and developments in world capital markets have increased the actual and potential mobility of multinational enterprises. This poses challenges for host countries’ tax and regulation policies. The ...

    • Multinationals, tax competition and outside options 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-09)
      We analyse tax competition when a multinational firm has invested in two countries but also has an outside option, e.g., towards a third country. An interesting finding is that more attractive outside options for firms may ...

    • Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement 

      Miller, David; Olsen, Trond E.; Watson, Joel (Discussion paper;8/18, Working paper, 2018-05-18)
      We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. An external, long-term contract governs the stage games the contracting parties will play ...

    • Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement 

      Chi, Chang Koo; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;6/18, Working paper, 2018-04-30)
      This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether ...

    • Relational incentive contracts for teams of multitasking agents 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;10/23, Working paper, 2023-06-30)
      We analyze optimal relational contracts for a group (team) of multitasking agents with hidden actions. Contracts are based on noisy signals that may be correlated across agents and between tasks. The optimal contract defines ...

    • Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)
      We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE ...

    • The rise of individual performance pay 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-07)
      Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ...

    • Sharing of endogenous risk in construction 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-07)
      In risk management of complex procurement projects in construction, the buyer has two principal instruments at his disposal: 1) the choice of time and resources put into engineering and design (project specification), thus ...

    • Spillovers and international competition for investments 

      Olsen, Trond E.; Osmundsen, Petter (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-05)
      Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm has private information about its efficiency ...