| dc.contributor.author | Bragelien, Iver | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2006-07-13T12:24:24Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2006-07-13T12:24:24Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1500-4066 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163641 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relational contract specifies the same payments that renegotiations would have led to in a spot mode, plus a fixed transfer and a one-step bonus scheme. The choice of ownership is shown to depend critically on the punishment strategies and the nature of the uncertainty. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 232446 bytes | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Science | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2002:27 | en |
| dc.subject | relational contracts | en |
| dc.subject | property rights | en |
| dc.subject | theory of the firm | en |
| dc.title | Asset ownership and relational contracts | en |
| dc.type | Working paper | en |
