Risk taking in selection contests

dc.contributor.author	Hvide, Hans K.
dc.contributor.author	Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
dc.date.accessioned	2006-07-14T10:28:24Z
dc.date.available	2006-07-14T10:28:24Z
dc.date.issued	2000-11
dc.identifier.issn	1500-4066
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163775
dc.description.abstract	We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways; a) by having a small number of contestants, and b) by restricting contestant quality. The results may contribute to our understanding of such diverse phenomena as promotion processes in firms, selection of fund managers and research tournaments.	en
dc.format.extent	284202 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Science	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2000:22	en
dc.subject	contest	en
dc.subject	risk taking	en
dc.subject	selection	en
dc.subject	tournament	en
dc.title	Risk taking in selection contests	en
dc.type	Working paper	en