Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBragelien, Iver
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-18T09:32:41Z
dc.date.available2006-07-18T09:32:41Z
dc.date.issued1998-12
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163831
dc.description.abstractI suggest a model for two managers/owners and two assets, where the optimal allocation of ownership rights is jointly determined by the parties’ risk aversion and the specificity of their investments. The managers are motivated by both verifiable and non-contractible benefits. The most risk averse manager should own at least one of the two assets, if the risk bearing costs associated with the non-contractible benefits are low compared to the risk bearing costs associated with the verifiable benefits. There is a tendency for integration to dominate non-integration when the two managers have very different risk preferences. Third party participation can reduce the total risk bearing costs or can strengthen the incentives to invest. The results are illustrated with a numerical example. In one interpretation of the model, the two managers are seen as two companies with complementary competencies who do a joint venture.en
dc.format.extent97022 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries1998:17en
dc.titleAsset ownership and risk aversionen
dc.typeWorking paperen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record