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dc.contributor.authorJörnsten, Kurt
dc.contributor.authorUbøe, Jan
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-21T12:51:30Z
dc.date.available2007-06-21T12:51:30Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163875
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we will consider a setting where a large number of agents are trading commodity bundles. Assuming that agents of the same type have a certain utility attached to each transaction, we construct a statistical equilibrium which in turn implies prices on the different commodities. Our basic question is then the following: Assume that some commodities come out with prices that are socially unacceptable. Is it possible to change these prices systematically if a new type of agents is paid to enter the market? In the paper we will consider explicit examples where this can be done.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2006:19en
dc.subjectagent preferencesen
dc.subjectefficient marketsen
dc.subjectstatistical equilibriaen
dc.subjectcommodity pricesen
dc.subjectarbitrageursen
dc.titleStrategic pricing of commoditiesen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Matematikk og Naturvitenskap: 400::Matematikk: 410::Anvendt matematikk: 413en
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210en


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