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dc.contributor.authorKvaløy, Ola
dc.contributor.authorOlsen, Trond E.
dc.date.accessioned2008-01-21T09:51:37Z
dc.date.available2008-01-21T09:51:37Z
dc.date.issued2007-07
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163917
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE schemes. The principal can take actions to constrain the agents' hold-up power by limiting their outside options and by protecting property rights, but once these actions are costly, a trade-off between incentive provision and agent control appears. The model contributes to the theory of the firm. It indicates why firms, not agents, own assets, and why peer-dependent incentive systems are more common within than between firms.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007:26en
dc.subjectrelational contractsen
dc.subjectmultiagent moral hazarden
dc.subjectendogenous hold-upen
dc.titleRelative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organizationen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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