dc.contributor.author | Stensholt, Eivind | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-06-24T13:08:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2008-06-24T13:08:13Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-06 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1500-4066 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163937 | |
dc.description.abstract | A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow’s theorem. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Science | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2008:12 | en |
dc.title | Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Statsvitenskap og organisasjonsteori: 240 | en |