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dc.contributor.authorStensholt, Eivind
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-24T13:08:13Z
dc.date.available2008-06-24T13:08:13Z
dc.date.issued2008-06
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163937
dc.description.abstractA very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow’s theorem.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:12en
dc.titleGibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connectionen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Statsvitenskap og organisasjonsteori: 240en


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