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The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.
Working paper
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dpfor2012-8.pdf (212.5Kb)
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/164199
Utgivelsesdato
2012-06
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  • Discussion papers (FOR) [531]
Sammendrag
When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive

effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract,

but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that

weaker enforcement may reduce the worker s effort, but lead to higher-

powered incentive contracts. This creates a seemingly negative rela-

tionship between effort and performance pay.
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics. Department of Finance and Management Science
Serie
Discussion paper;2012:8

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