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dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.contributor.authorStähler, Frank
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-07T08:47:36Z
dc.date.available2017-04-07T08:47:36Z
dc.date.issued2017-03-30
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2437087
dc.description.abstractInvestor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) were supposed to become an integral part of multilateral trade and investment agreements although the partner countries of these deals do not suffer from substantial institutional weakness. This paper shows why multinational firms lobby for ISDS also in this environment beyond the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. ISDS makes them more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investment. Therefore, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game, and competition with a domestic firm does not necessarily help but may imply even more excessive investment.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherFORnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;4/17
dc.subjectInvestor-State Dispute Settlementnb_NO
dc.subjectMulitnational Enterprisesnb_NO
dc.subjectForeign Direct Investmentnb_NO
dc.subjectTTIPnb_NO
dc.subjectTPPnb_NO
dc.titleInvestor State Dispute Settlement and Multinational Firm Behaviornb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber17nb_NO


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