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Licensing and Innovation with Imperfect Contract Enforcement

Gilbert, Richard; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/280979
Date
2015-03
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [578]
Abstract
Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing

contracts is often imperfect. We explore the implications of weak enforcement of contractual

commitments on the licensing conduct of firms and market performance. An

upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed

fee and a per-unit royalty. Strictly positive per-unit royalties maximize the licensor’s profit

if competition among licensees limits joint profits. Although imperfect contract enforcement

lowers the profits of the upstream firm, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases

downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.
Publisher
SAM
Series
Discussion paper;05/15

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