Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGilbert, Richard
dc.contributor.authorKristiansen, Eirik Gaard
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-07T09:21:13Z
dc.date.available2015-04-07T09:21:13Z
dc.date.issued2015-03
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/280979
dc.description.abstractLicensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We explore the implications of weak enforcement of contractual commitments on the licensing conduct of firms and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per-unit royalty. Strictly positive per-unit royalties maximize the licensor’s profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. Although imperfect contract enforcement lowers the profits of the upstream firm, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherSAMnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;05/15
dc.titleLicensing and Innovation with Imperfect Contract Enforcementnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212nb_NO


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record