Equilibrium Selection in Hawk-Dove Games

dc.contributor.author	Blázquez, Mario
dc.contributor.author	Koptyug, Nikita
dc.date.accessioned	2022-06-29T13:35:38Z
dc.date.available	2022-06-29T13:35:38Z
dc.date.issued	2022-06-29
dc.identifier.issn	2387-3000
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3001583
dc.description.abstract	In Hawk-Dove games with mulitiplicity of equilibria, we study which equilibria are selected using various equilibrium selection methods. Using a uniform price auction as an illustrative example, we apply the tracing procedure method of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the robustness to strategic uncertainty method of Andersson, Argenton and Weibull (2014), and the quantal response method of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) to predict which equilibrium is selected by the players and how changes to the various model parameters impact the selected equilibria.	en_US
dc.language.iso	eng	en_US
dc.publisher	FOR	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper;12/22
dc.subject	Hawk-Dove games	en_US
dc.subject	equilibrium selection	en_US
dc.subject	tracing procedure method	en_US
dc.subject	robustness to strategic uncertainty method	en_US
dc.subject	quantal response method	en_US
dc.title	Equilibrium Selection in Hawk-Dove Games	en_US
dc.type	Working paper	en_US
dc.source.pagenumber	38	en_US