Browsing NHH Brage by Author "Kvaløy, Ola"
Now showing items 1-20 of 31
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Asset specificity and vertical integration
Kvaløy, Ola (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-09)Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration reduces this problem of opportunism. In ... -
Asset specificity and vertical integration
Kvaløy, Ola (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration.The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration reduces this problem of opportunism. In ... -
Avveininger ved bruk av ulike tilknytningsformer i oljebransjen
Zeiler-Sørensen, Sarah Louise (Master thesis, 2016-03-29)Denne studien ser nærmere på hvordan endringer i oljesektoren påvirker rekruttering, ansettelsesforhold og bruk av ulike tilknytningsformer i denne bransjen. I lys av dette analyseres og diskuteres omfang og motiv, r ... -
Balanced scorecards: a relational contract approach
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;3/20, Working paper, 2020-05-08)Reward systems based on balanced scorecards typically connect pay to an index, i.e. a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. However, there is no formal incentive model that actually describe this kind of index ... -
Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Working paper, Working paper, 2008-05)The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ... -
Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ... -
Crime and punishment : when tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge
Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;4/2013, Working paper, 2013-02)The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this intuitive relationship. This paper offers ... -
Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge
Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;05/13, Working paper, 2013-05)The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is how- ever hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper ... -
Delingsøkonomien i Norge : kartlegging og kategorisering av delingstjenester i det norske markedet
Hågensli, Mia; Solibakke, Mariann Heggland (Master thesis, 2016)Delingsøkonomi er et relativt nytt fenomen, og kan defineres som verdien av å gjøre underutnyttede ressurser tilgjengelig på nettbaserte samfunn. Flere vil kjenne til begrepet gjennom framstillingen i media, der begrepet ... -
Economic organization of specific assets in the offshore industry
Kvaløy, Ola (Report, Research report, 2000-07)In the international offshore industry we find that the oil companies and their main suppliers usually enjoy separate ownership. But the main contractors manage a capital stock, and produce inputs, that are highly specific ... -
Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Journal article, 2009)Principal-agent models usually invoke the strong assumption that the parties know for sure ex ante whether a variable is verifiable or not. This paper assumes that only the probability of verification is known, and that ... -
Endogenous verifiability in relational contracting
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-11)We analyze a repeated principal-agent trust game where the principal makes a specific investment by paying the agent up-front, expecting an agreed upon quality level in return. The verifiability of the agent’s action is ... -
Glasstak, glassklipper og glassko : en studie av kvinnelige ledere i Norge
Jacobsen, Sissel; Kaltenborn, Helene (Master thesis, 2018)Kjønnsulikheter i arbeidsmarkedet har lenge vært en pågående samfunnsdebatt. Med denne studien ønsket vi å gi et bidrag til denne debatten og den eksisterende litteraturen om kvinner og ledelse. Formålet var å beskrive ... -
Human capital and risk aversion in relational incentive contracts
Kvaløy, Ola (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)This paper examines a self-enforced relational incentive contract between a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent where the agent's human capital is essential in ex post realization of values. I analyse the effect ... -
Hvilken effekt har provisjonslønn på motivasjonen til de ansatte i frisørbransjen?
Villa, Sigrid Thynes; Vatle, Marte (Master thesis, 2015)Masteroppgaven har sett på hvilken effekt provisjonslønn har på motivasjonen til de ansatte i frisørbransjen. Det ble levert ut et spørreskjema med 16 spørsmål som frisører ved ulike salonger i Bergen har besvart. ... -
Incentive provision when contracting is costly
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-08)We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. We show that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot ... -
Performance appraisal and career opportunities : a case study
Mohn, Klaus; Kvaløy, Ola; Hunnes, Arngrim (Working paper, Working paper, 2009-03)Based on powerful survey data from an international oil company in Norway, we explore perceptions of performance appraisal and career opportunities among leaders and employees. Perceptions indicate that performance and ... -
Prestasjonslønn VS fastlønn : en komparativ casestudie av to lønnssystemer i et forsikringsselskap
Horvei, Christina; Hovdenakk, Synnøve (Master thesis, 2017)Formålet med denne utredningen er å sammenligne prestasjonslønn og fastlønn med tanke på hvorvidt de ansatte presterer ulikt ut i fra hvordan de blir lønnet. Vi har derfor foretatt en komparativ casestudie av to lønnssystemer ... -
Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs
Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond Egil (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)We analyze relational contracts between a principal and a set of risk-neutral agents whose outputs are correlated. When only the agents’ aggregate output can be observed, a team incentive scheme is shown to be optimal, ... -
Relational incentive contracts and allocation of ownership rights : four essays
Kvaløy, Ola (Doctoral thesis, 2003)