• Asset specificity and vertical integration 

      Kvaløy, Ola (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-09)
      Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration reduces this problem of opportunism. In ...
    • Asset specificity and vertical integration 

      Kvaløy, Ola (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration.The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration reduces this problem of opportunism. In ...
    • Avveininger ved bruk av ulike tilknytningsformer i oljebransjen 

      Zeiler-Sørensen, Sarah Louise (Master thesis, 2016-03-29)
      Denne studien ser nærmere på hvordan endringer i oljesektoren påvirker rekruttering, ansettelsesforhold og bruk av ulike tilknytningsformer i denne bransjen. I lys av dette analyseres og diskuteres omfang og motiv, r ...
    • Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)
      The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ...
    • Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Working paper, Working paper, 2008-05)
      The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ...
    • Crime and punishment : when tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge 

      Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;4/2013, Working paper, 2013-02)
      The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this intuitive relationship. This paper offers ...
    • Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge 

      Jensen, Sissel; Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E.; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper;05/13, Working paper, 2013-05)
      The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is how- ever hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper ...
    • Delingsøkonomien i Norge : kartlegging og kategorisering av delingstjenester i det norske markedet 

      Hågensli, Mia; Solibakke, Mariann Heggland (Master thesis, 2016)
      Delingsøkonomi er et relativt nytt fenomen, og kan defineres som verdien av å gjøre underutnyttede ressurser tilgjengelig på nettbaserte samfunn. Flere vil kjenne til begrepet gjennom framstillingen i media, der begrepet ...
    • Economic organization of specific assets in the offshore industry 

      Kvaløy, Ola (Report, Research report, 2000-07)
      In the international offshore industry we find that the oil companies and their main suppliers usually enjoy separate ownership. But the main contractors manage a capital stock, and produce inputs, that are highly specific ...
    • Endogenous verifiability in relational contracting 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-11)
      We analyze a repeated principal-agent trust game where the principal makes a specific investment by paying the agent up-front, expecting an agreed upon quality level in return. The verifiability of the agent’s action is ...
    • Glasstak, glassklipper og glassko : en studie av kvinnelige ledere i Norge 

      Jacobsen, Sissel; Kaltenborn, Helene (Master thesis, 2018)
      Kjønnsulikheter i arbeidsmarkedet har lenge vært en pågående samfunnsdebatt. Med denne studien ønsket vi å gi et bidrag til denne debatten og den eksisterende litteraturen om kvinner og ledelse. Formålet var å beskrive ...
    • Human capital and risk aversion in relational incentive contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      This paper examines a self-enforced relational incentive contract between a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent where the agent's human capital is essential in ex post realization of values. I analyse the effect ...
    • Hvilken effekt har provisjonslønn på motivasjonen til de ansatte i frisørbransjen? 

      Villa, Sigrid Thynes; Vatle, Marte (Master thesis, 2015)
      Masteroppgaven har sett på hvilken effekt provisjonslønn har på motivasjonen til de ansatte i frisørbransjen. Det ble levert ut et spørreskjema med 16 spørsmål som frisører ved ulike salonger i Bergen har besvart. ...
    • Incentive provision when contracting is costly 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-08)
      We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. We show that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot ...
    • Performance appraisal and career opportunities : a case study 

      Mohn, Klaus; Kvaløy, Ola; Hunnes, Arngrim (Working paper, Working paper, 2009-03)
      Based on powerful survey data from an international oil company in Norway, we explore perceptions of performance appraisal and career opportunities among leaders and employees. Perceptions indicate that performance and ...
    • Prestasjonslønn VS fastlønn : en komparativ casestudie av to lønnssystemer i et forsikringsselskap 

      Horvei, Christina; Hovdenakk, Synnøve (Master thesis, 2017)
      Formålet med denne utredningen er å sammenligne prestasjonslønn og fastlønn med tanke på hvorvidt de ansatte presterer ulikt ut i fra hvordan de blir lønnet. Vi har derfor foretatt en komparativ casestudie av to lønnssystemer ...
    • Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond Egil (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)
      We analyze relational contracts between a principal and a set of risk-neutral agents whose outputs are correlated. When only the agents’ aggregate output can be observed, a team incentive scheme is shown to be optimal, ...
    • Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)
      We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE ...
    • The rise of individual performance pay 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-07)
      Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ...