• Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-09)
      I analyse whether multilateral lending may be justified in a world of global capital markets if multilaterals have an informational advantage over lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection ...
    • Buying influence : aid fungibility in a strategic perspective 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-04)
      I study equilibria of non-cooperative games between an aid donor and a recipient when there is conflict over the allocation of their combined budgets. The general conclusion is that a donor’s influence over outcomes is ...
    • Do non-enforceable contracts matter? Evidence from an international lab experiment 

      Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hagen, Rune Jansen; Sørensen, Erik Ø.; Tungodden, Bertil (Discussion paper;2/2012, Working paper, 2012-02)
      Many verifiable contracts are impossible or difficult to enforce. This applies to contracts among family and friends, contracts regulating market transactions, and sovereign debt contracts. Do such non-enforceable contracts ...
    • Foreign aid and domestic politics : implications for aid selectivity 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-06)
      The links between foreign aid and policies in developing countries have been at the forefront of the policy debate for decades. An emerging consensus touts aid selectivity as the solution to the failures of conditionality. ...
    • Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003)
      Should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact differs across ...
    • Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-12)
      Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its budget to an agent less averse to inequality than itself in order to alleviate the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? Despite the intuitive appeal of ...