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dc.contributor.authorKolstad, Ivar
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-10T10:52:55Z
dc.date.available2006-08-10T10:52:55Z
dc.date.issued2002-03
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162908
dc.description.abstractA two-population evolutionary model of learning is proposed where there is a conflict of interests between populations, and where interaction ranges from complete viscosity to complete dispersion. The long run stochastically stable states under complete viscosity match those of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993). With complete dispersion, the long run stochastically stable states match those of Hehenkamp (2001). With fluid interaction, there is a possibility of convention coexistence. Welfare properties of the long run stochastically stable states are examined using utilitarian and Rawlsian measures of welfare.en
dc.format.extent126907 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2002:7en
dc.subjectevolutionary game theoryen
dc.subjectviscosityen
dc.subjectlearningen
dc.subjectstochastic stabilityen
dc.subjectequilibrium selectionen
dc.subjectconvention coexistenceen
dc.titleViscosity and dispersion in an evolutionary model of learningen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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