• Aspects of the political economy of foreign aid 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Working paper, Working paper, 2000-12)
      The interaction of external financing with economic reforms in developing countries has been at the forefront of the policy debate for the last 15-20 years. In this paper, a simple model in which an aid donor faces either ...
    • Assessing the economic gains of free market access for the least developed countries in the QUAD 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen; Mæstad, Ottar; Wiig, Arne (Working Paper, Working paper, 2002-11)
      The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic impact on the least developed countries (LDCs) of reduced trade barriers in their export markets. 48 countries are currently designated as “least developed” by the ...
    • Buying influence : aid fungibility in a strategic perspective 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Working Paper, Working paper, 2002-01)
      I study equilibria of non-cooperative budgetary games between an aid donor and a recipient when there is conflict over the preferred allocation of the combined budgets of the two parties. I show that final outcomes are the ...
    • Global economics and national politics 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen; Torsvik, Gaute (Working paper, Working paper, 2001-12)
      This paper contributes to the literature on the political economy of increased capital mobility. Two parties, one from the left and one from the right, compete for position. The election is to be held in the future and the ...
    • National responsibility and the just distribution of debt relief 

      Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hagen, Rune Jansen; Tungodden, Bertil (Working paper, Working paper, 2006-08)
      A central question in the debate on debt relief has been whether or not highly indebted poor countries should be held responsible for their sovereign debt. Proponents of debt relief typically argue that this is not fair ...
    • Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its budget to an agent less averse to inequality than itself in order to alleviate the Samaritan's Dilemma it is facing? Despite the intuitive appeal of this ...