• Asset specificity and vertical integration 

      Kvaløy, Ola (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      Asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration.The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration reduces this problem of opportunism. In ...
    • Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Working paper, Working paper, 2008-05)
      The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ...
    • Human capital and risk aversion in relational incentive contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      This paper examines a self-enforced relational incentive contract between a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent where the agent's human capital is essential in ex post realization of values. I analyse the effect ...
    • Performance appraisal and career opportunities : a case study 

      Mohn, Klaus; Kvaløy, Ola; Hunnes, Arngrim (Working paper, Working paper, 2009-03)
      Based on powerful survey data from an international oil company in Norway, we explore perceptions of performance appraisal and career opportunities among leaders and employees. Perceptions indicate that performance and ...
    • Team incentives in relational contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      Incentive schemes for teams are compared. I ask: under which conditions are relational incentive contracts based on joint performance evaluation, relative performance evaluation and independent performance evaluation ...
    • Team incentives in relational employment contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Working paper, Working paper, 2005-08)
      The paper analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively joint, relative and indendent performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is ...
    • Vertical coordination in the salmon supply chain 

      Tveterås, Ragnar; Kvaløy, Ola (Working paper, Working paper, 2004-01)
      The extent of vertical coordination in the supply chain for salmon was limited until the early 1990s. During the last ten years, however, there have been several developments that have lead to tighter vertical coordination ...