Browsing Working papers (SNF) by Author "Vagstad, Steinar"
Now showing items 1-8 of 8
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Consumer heterogeneity and pricing in a duopoly with switching costs
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working paper, Working paper, 2000-05)It is well-known that switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching costs is above some critical level. We show that ... -
Early information in auctions with entry
Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2004-01)Consider an auction in which potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values, but where the auction designer can release information so that the bidders learn their values before entry. Such ... -
On how size and composition of customer bases affect equilibrium in a duopoly with switching costs
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-10)Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switchi8ng cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric ... -
Price discrimination with uncertain consumers
Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-04)Many goods and services are priced non-linearly, and a common way to implement nonlinear price schedules is to let consumers choose from a menu of two-part tariffs. If consumers know their demand at the time they choose ... -
Second-period pricing in a duopoly with switching costs : the effect of size and composition of customer bases
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-04)Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric ... -
Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?
Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-06)Consider an auction in wich potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values (Levin and Smith, 1994). Suppose the auction designer can make the bidders learn their value before entry (as in ... -
Synergies and non-discriminatory access pricing
Hagen, Kåre Petter; Hansen, Bjørn; Vagstad, Steinar (Working paper, Working paper, 2004-11)According to the new European telecom regulation, incumbent operators are required to provide access to such bottlenecks on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. We explore different interpretations of this general ... -
Why is on-net traffic cheaper than off-net traffic?
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2002-04)Received literature have shown that if competing Telecom networks are restricted to linear pricing and are unable to discriminate between on- and off-net calls, high access charges can be a device for facilitating collusion. ...