• Access price regulation facilitates strategic transfer pricing 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Foros, Øystein (Working Paper, Working paper, 2005-10)
      Access price regulation is used in telecommunications to prevent that a vertically integrated firm, that controls an essential input, raises the rivals` costs. When the authorities remove the access price as a strategic ...
    • Managerial incentives and access price regulation 

      Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Sørgard, Lars (Working paper, Working paper, 2004-10)
      Policy makers have identified the non-discrimination principle as a key instrument to regulate vertically integrated firms in control of upstream bottlenecks. Economists argue that the non-discrimination principle may ...
    • Why are mobile voice calls so expensive when abroad? 

      Ambjørnsen, Terje; Foros, Øystein; Wasenden, Ole C. (Working paper, Working paper, 2007-11)
      Mobile phone usage when traveling abroad is expensive. We show that the more firms enter the market - which may lower domestic voice call prices - the higher wholesale and retail prices for mobile usage abroad may become.