• Access price regulation facilitates strategic transfer pricing 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Foros, Øystein (Working Paper, Working paper, 2005-10)
      Access price regulation is used in telecommunications to prevent that a vertically integrated firm, that controls an essential input, raises the rivals` costs. When the authorities remove the access price as a strategic ...
    • Cartels uncovered 

      Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto (Working paper, Working paper, 2011-03)
      How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the need for competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that answers the question, taking into account that often we do not know whether a cartel ...
    • Contracting versus bypassing 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Sørgard, Lars (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      One existing distributor controls the existing access to end users. There are one incumbent producer and one potential entrant, both with a potential for bypassing the distributor. We find that the distributor always signs ...
    • Do incumbents have incentives to degrade interconnection quality in the internet? 

      Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Sand, Jan Yngve (Working Paper, Working paper, 2002-04)
    • Do internet incumbents choose low interconnection quality? 

      Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Sand, Jan Yngve (Working Paper, Working paper, 2004-06)
      In this paper we analyze the interconnection incentives for two networks that differ with respect to size of their installed based. In the first part we prove that the smaller firm may be harmed in competition for new ...
    • Managerial incentives and access price regulation 

      Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Sørgard, Lars (Working paper, Working paper, 2004-10)
      Policy makers have identified the non-discrimination principle as a key instrument to regulate vertically integrated firms in control of upstream bottlenecks. Economists argue that the non-discrimination principle may ...
    • On the choice of royalty rule to cover fixed costs in input joint ventures 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle (Working paper;16/13, Working paper, 2013-07)
      In a model where two competing downstream firms establish an input joint venture (JV), we analyze how different royalty rules for covering fixed costs affect channel profits. Under running royalties (regardless of whether ...
    • Price-dependent profit-sharing as a channel coordination device 

      Foros, Øystein; Hagen, Kåre Petter; Kind, Hans Jarle (Working paper, Working paper, 2008-03)
      We show how an upstream firm by using a price-dependent profit-sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes. With this rule the upstream firm induces ...
    • The SMS bandwagon in Norway : what made the market? 

      Andersson, Kjetil; Foros, Øystein; Steen, Frode (Working paper, Working paper, 2004-06)
      Short Message Service (SMS) has been an overwhelming success in Europe, substantially larger than in the United States. In relative terms Norway represents one of the largest SMS markets in the world. The aim of the paper ...
    • Why is on-net traffic cheaper than off-net traffic? 

      Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (Working Paper, Working paper, 2002-04)
      Received literature have shown that if competing Telecom networks are restricted to linear pricing and are unable to discriminate between on- and off-net calls, high access charges can be a device for facilitating collusion. ...