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dc.contributor.authorFjell, Kenneth
dc.contributor.authorForos, Øystein
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-20T16:05:01Z
dc.date.available2006-06-20T16:05:01Z
dc.date.issued2005-10
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165428
dc.description.abstractAccess price regulation is used in telecommunications to prevent that a vertically integrated firm, that controls an essential input, raises the rivals` costs. When the authorities remove the access price as a strategic tool, they at the same time make it optimal for the vertically integrated firm to reorganize from centralized pricing to decentralized pricing in order to use the transfer price as an alternative strategic device. To implement access price regulation, authorities use accounting separation and transparent transfer prices as complementary remedies. However, these remedies facilitate the transfer price as a strategic device used to soften competition. Consequently, the regulation may protect the rivals (and the incumbent) from competition to the detriment of consumers.en
dc.format.extent291095 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2005:60en
dc.subjecttelecommunicationen
dc.subjectcompetitionen
dc.subjectaccess pricingen
dc.titleAccess price regulation facilitates strategic transfer pricingen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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