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dc.contributor.authorHaaland, Jan Ingvald Meidell
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-23T12:13:02Z
dc.date.available2006-06-23T12:13:02Z
dc.date.issued2004-11
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165534
dc.description.abstractWe set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordination policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.en
dc.format.extent579787 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:60en
dc.subjecttradeen
dc.subjectR&Den
dc.subjectsubsidiesen
dc.subjectprocess innovationen
dc.titleR&D policies, trade and process innovationen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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