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dc.contributor.authorHaaland, Jan Ingvald Meidell
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-28T07:13:20Z
dc.date.available2006-06-28T07:13:20Z
dc.date.issued2003-11
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165628
dc.description.abstractShould R&D policies within an economic union be centralized or decentralized to each individual country? Do non-cooperative policies - typically implying policy competition between countries - always give rise to too high R&D subsidies in a decentralized policy regime? Should small countries subsidize R&D more than larger countries? To address such questions, we construct a simple model with horizontally differentiated consumer goods, where each firm may invest in quality-improving R&D. Assuming that the goods are produced in different countries within an economic union, we compare non-cooperative and cooperative R&D policies. We show that non-cooperative policies imply too small R&D subsidies for horizontally differentiated goods and too high subsidies for goods that are close substitutes. Furthermore, small, net exporting countries of R&D intensive goods have less incentives to subsidize R&D than large countries, resulting in an unwarranted vertical product differentiation between goods produced in different countries. Coordination of R&D policies at the union level helps overcome some of these problems. However, if only a subset of countries cooperate, union welfare may be lower than if there is no R&D cooperation at all.en
dc.format.extent314418 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:49en
dc.titleCooperative and non-cooperative R&D policy in an economic unionen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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