Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorLommerud, Kjell Erik
dc.contributor.authorSandvik, Bjørn
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-20T20:16:36Z
dc.date.available2006-07-20T20:16:36Z
dc.date.issued2001-08
dc.identifier.issn0803-4028
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165832
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a `good jobs` sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by the trade unions. We find that whether the government should subsidise or tax investments is crucially dependent on union bargaining strength. If unions are weak, the optimal tax policy implies a combination of investment taxes and progressive income taxation. On the other hand, if unions are strong, we find that the best option for the government is to use investment subsidies in combination with either progressive or proportional taxation, the latter being the optimal policy if the government is not too concerned about inequality and if the cost of income taxation is sufficiently high.en
dc.format.extent1147680 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2001:40en
dc.subjectrent sharingen
dc.subjectsegmented labour marketsen
dc.subjectoptimal taxationen
dc.subjectredistributionen
dc.titleGood jobs, bad jobs and redistributionen
dc.typeWorking paperen


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel