Merger and collusion in contests

dc.contributor.author	Huck, Steffan
dc.contributor.author	Konrad, Kai A.
dc.contributor.author	Müller, Wieland
dc.date.accessioned	2006-09-18T07:16:22Z
dc.date.available	2006-09-18T07:16:22Z
dc.date.issued	2000-12
dc.identifier.issn	0803-4028
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/165958
dc.description.abstract	Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.	en
dc.format.extent	850988 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	SNF	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2000:82	en
dc.subject	contests	en
dc.subject	merger	en
dc.subject	collusion	en
dc.subject	promotional competition	en
dc.title	Merger and collusion in contests	en
dc.type	Working paper	en