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dc.contributor.authorFjell, Kenneth
dc.contributor.authorHeywood, John S.
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-07T09:03:52Z
dc.date.available2006-09-07T09:03:52Z
dc.date.issued2001-04
dc.identifier.issn0803-4028
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/166010
dc.description.abstractResearch on spatial price discrimination demonstrates that strategic (off center) location choices by downstream firms can increase downstream profit and reduce both the profit of an upstream monopoly and social welfare. This paper examines exclusive territories as a vertical control mechanism and shows that such territories can force downstream firms to return to the center of the market. Yet, exclusive territories cannot completely eliminate the influence of strategic downstream location - the profit maximizing exclusive territories are either too small or too large to be socially efficient.en
dc.format.extent746155 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2001:15en
dc.titleCan exclusive territories limit strategic location downstream?en
dc.typeWorking paperen


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