On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets

dc.contributor.author	Kind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.author	Koethenbuerger, Marko
dc.contributor.author	Schjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned	2008-08-28T08:41:33Z
dc.date.available	2008-08-28T08:41:33Z
dc.date.issued	2008-04
dc.identifier.issn	1503-2140
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166174
dc.description.abstract	A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance need not hold in two-sided markets.	en
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	SNF	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2008:08	en
dc.subject	ad valorem taxes	en
dc.subject	unit taxes	en
dc.subject	two-sided markets	en
dc.subject	revenue-dominance	en
dc.subject	welfare-dominance	en
dc.title	On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets	en
dc.type	Working paper	en