Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorGodal, Odd
dc.contributor.authorHoltsmark, Bjart
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-28T11:25:16Z
dc.date.available2011-09-28T11:25:16Z
dc.date.issued2011-07
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/166418
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies, in a numerical environment, climate treaties with emissions trading when national quotas result from strategic individual choice. We find that the larger the number of parties to the deal, the smaller are the emissions reductions and the lower the welfare. If insisting on stability with respect to participation, climate treaties involve few parties and yield practically no emissions reductions. While these results contrast with some optimistic studies, our numerical example confirms established results if modelling the problem in the more traditional sense.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2011:17en
dc.titleOn the efficiency gains of emissions trading when climate deals are non-cooperativeen
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212en


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel