| dc.contributor.author | Godal, Odd | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-28T11:32:11Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2011-09-28T11:32:11Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011-07 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1503-2140 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166420 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The applicability of some popular and basic permit market theories has been questioned. Drawing on noncooperative equilibrium theory for pure exchange economies, this article adapts several well-established alternative models to permit exchange. Some qualitative properties of the associated equilibria are provided, including two games with equilibria that in a sense coincide. Nevertheless, as there exist quite a few models potentially applicable to emissions trading, with equilibria that range from autarky to Pareto optimality, it seems that economics lacks a broadly accepted basic theory for permit markets. | en |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.publisher | SNF | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working paper | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2011:18 | en |
| dc.subject | permit markets | en |
| dc.subject | market power | en |
| dc.subject | multilateral oligopoly | en |
| dc.subject | strategic exchange | en |
| dc.title | Noncooperative models of permit markets | en |
| dc.type | Working paper | en |
| dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212 | en |
