dc.contributor.author | Nese, Gjermund | |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-06-23T11:49:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-06-23T11:49:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-11 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1503-2140 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166482 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we let the governments in the importing and exporting countries use tax instruments strategically to shift rents up or down the vertical value-chain. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country while harming an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries. | en |
dc.format.extent | 295793 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | SNF | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2004:57 | en |
dc.subject | successive oligopoly | en |
dc.subject | strategic trade policy | en |
dc.subject | industry concentration | en |
dc.title | Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |