dc.contributor.author | Lommerud, Kjell Erik | |
dc.contributor.author | Sørgard, Lars | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-09-01T07:09:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-09-01T07:09:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2000-11 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0803-4028 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/166598 | |
dc.description.abstract | Telecommunications is an industry characterised by heavy investments in infrastructure. Historically, one firm has typically been granted a national monopoly. Recently, competition has been opened up. Entrants have been allowed to use the existing network infrastructure at a regulated access price. We study the rivalry between incumbents and entrants under two distinct types of entry: Newcomer entry and reciprocal entry. The latter refers to the situation where two neighbouring "old monopolies" enter each other's markets. A question that is given special attention is when we would expect market sharing type collusion in the latter case. | en |
dc.format.extent | 194616 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | SNF | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2000:62 | en |
dc.title | Entry in telecommunication : customer loyalty, price sensitivity and access prices | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |