Competition and risk taking in the banking industry: The case of capital requirements

dc.contributor.author	Ulsaker, Simen A.
dc.date.accessioned	2018-11-20T09:18:06Z
dc.date.available	2018-11-20T09:18:06Z
dc.date.issued	2017-12
dc.identifier.issn	1503-2140
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2573875
dc.description.abstract	This article examines how stricter capital requirements affect competition and risk-taking incentives in the banking industry. When banks choose their risk profiles by solving portfolio problems, there is a clear trade-off between competition and risk taking: stricter capital requirements restrict risk taking but soften competition for deposits. The clear trade-off disappears when banks compete in a loan market rather than choose their risk profiles directly. In this case, stricter capital requirements will lead to less risk taking only if they also lead to stronger competition in the loan market.	nb_NO
dc.language.iso	eng	nb_NO
dc.publisher	SNF	nb_NO
dc.title	Competition and risk taking in the banking industry: The case of capital requirements	nb_NO
dc.type	Working paper	nb_NO