Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kurt R.
dc.contributor.authorHolmås, Tor Helge
dc.contributor.authorMonstad, Karin
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-21T11:24:42Z
dc.date.available2018-11-21T11:24:42Z
dc.date.issued2018-09
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2574098
dc.description.abstractCompetition among physicians is widespread, but compelling empirical evidence on its impact on service provision is limited, mainly due to endogeneity issues. In this paper we exploit that many GPs, in addition to own practice, work in local emergency centres, where the matching of patients to GPs is random. The same GP is observed both with competition (own practice) and without (emergency centre). Using high-dimensional fixed- effect models, we find that GPs with a fee-for-service (fixed-salary) contract are 12 (8) percentage points more likely to certify sick leave at own practice than at the emergency centre. Thus, competition has a positive impact on GPs.sicklisting that is strongly reinforced by financial incentives.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherSNFnb_NO
dc.titleCompetition and physician behaviour: Does the competitive environment affect the propensity to issue sickness certificates?nb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record