How does the type of remuneration affect physician behaviour? Fixed salary versus fee-for-service
dc.contributor.author | Brekke, Kurt R. | |
dc.contributor.author | Holmås, Tor Helge | |
dc.contributor.author | Monstad, Karin | |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-21T11:28:58Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-11-21T11:28:58Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-09 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1503-2140 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2574101 | |
dc.description.abstract | We analyse the effects of fee-for-service versus fixed salary on the treatment decisions of general practitioners (GPs) and on patients’ health outcomes. Using rich Norwegian register data during 2009-2013, we find that GPs respond strongly and consistently to changes in remuneration type. Compared with fixed salary, GP payment by fee-for-service leads to an increase in the supply of consultations and a higher provision of medical services (along several dimensions) per consultation. This has also significant implications for patients’ health outcomes, with a close to 20 percent reduction in the probability of an emergency hospital admission shortly after a GP consultation. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.publisher | SNF | nb_NO |
dc.title | How does the type of remuneration affect physician behaviour? Fixed salary versus fee-for-service | nb_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | nb_NO |
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Working papers (SNF) [809]