Blar i Discussion papers (SAM) på forfatter "Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard"

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    • Endogenous product differentiation in credit markets : what do borrowers pay for? 

      Kim, Moshe; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard; Vale, Bent (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-11)
      This paper studies strategies pursued by banks in order to differentiate their services from those of their rivals. In that way competition among banks is softened. More specifically we analyze if the bank size, the ...

    • Explicit and implicit incentives in fund management 

      Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-01)
      Fund managers compete to attract new investors. Competition and fund management contracts provide implicit and explicit incentives for fund management. I study the combined effect of these two types of incentives on i) ...

    • Licensing and Innovation with Imperfect Contract Enforcement 

      Gilbert, Richard; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper;05/15, Working paper, 2015-03)
      Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We explore the implications of weak enforcement of contractual commitments on the licensing conduct of ...

    • Management of knowledge workers 

      Hvide, Hans K.; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-05)
      We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the effects ...

    • Paying for staying : managerial contracts and the retention motive 

      Ellingsen, Tore; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper;8/2012, Working paper, 2012-03)
      Talented managers may leave the firm in order to work elsewhere. Focusing on the portability of managers' resources, we develop a model in which managerial compensation is designed to prevent inefficient departure. The ...

    • Strategic bank monitoring and firms’ debt structure 

      Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-10)
      Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring intensity. Monitoring improves credit allocation, but creates informational lock-in effects in bank-borrower relationships. In a competitive credit market, ...

    • Vaporware 

      Choi, Jay Pil; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard; Nahm, Jae (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-09)
      It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability, especially in the computer industry. This practice of preannouncement often has been derisively referred to ...

    • What determines banks’ market power? : Akerlof versus Herfindahl 

      Kim, Moshe; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard; Vale, Bent (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-09)
      We introduce a model analyzing how asymmetric information problems in a bank-loan market may evolve over the age of a borrowing firm. The model predicts a life-cycle pattern for banks’ interest rate markup. Young firms ...