• Access price regulation facilitates strategic transfer pricing 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Foros, Øystein (Working Paper, Working paper, 2005-10)
      Access price regulation is used in telecommunications to prevent that a vertically integrated firm, that controls an essential input, raises the rivals` costs. When the authorities remove the access price as a strategic ...
    • Are tv-viewers and surfers different breeds? : broadband demand and asymmetric cross-price effects 

      Andersson, Kjetil; Fjell, Kenneth; Foros, Øystein (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-04)
      We consider two different qualities of broadband access, one that simply means greater access speed to Internet applications and content and a premium version that also gives access to interactive TV-centric applications. ...
    • Can exclusive territories limit strategic location downstream? 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Heywood, John S. (Working Paper, Working paper, 2001-04)
      Research on spatial price discrimination demonstrates that strategic (off center) location choices by downstream firms can increase downstream profit and reduce both the profit of an upstream monopoly and social welfare. ...
    • The economics of social networks : the winner takes it all? 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Foros, Øystein; Steen, Frode (2010:42, Working paper, 2010-09)
      We look at the economics of social networks. Key economic features of these are positive network effects, giving rise to positive feedback effects that may lead to a winner-takes-it-all market. Social networks’ revenues ...
    • Elasticity based pricing rules in telecommunications : a cautionary note 

      Fjell, Kenneth (Working Paper, Working paper, 2002-01)
      To recover large common (sunk) costs, telecommunications operators are often recommended to follow an inverse elasticity based pricing; setting the highest markups for the services with the least elastic demand. This is ...
    • Employing endogenous access pricing to enhance incentives for efficient upstream operation 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Pal, Debashis; Sappington, David E.M. (Working paper;09/13, Working paper, 2013-01)
      Endogenous access pricing (ENAP) is an alternative to the more traditional form of access pricing that sets the access price to reflect the regulator’s estimate of the supplier’s average cost of providing access. Under ...
    • On the choice of royalty rule to cover fixed costs in input joint ventures 

      Fjell, Kenneth; Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle (Working paper;16/13, Working paper, 2013-07)
      In a model where two competing downstream firms establish an input joint venture (JV), we analyze how different royalty rules for covering fixed costs affect channel profits. Under running royalties (regardless of whether ...
    • Pricing of on-line advertising: pay-per-view or pay-per-click? 

      Fjell, Kenneth (Working paper, Working paper, 2007-10)
      We analyse the choice of pay-per-view (PPV) and price-per-click (PPC) when a web publisher is a price taker in the market for advertising banners, and the number of visits is decreasing in advertising. The main result is ...
    • Taking ABC to court : a research note on cost oriented access prices in Telecom 

      Bjørnenak, Trond; Fjell, Kenneth (Working Paper, Working paper, 2005-12)
      This paper investigates how and why Activity Based Costing (ABC) has been introduced to the cost based price regulation regime in the telecommunication sector. The study draws on empirical insight from a recent court case ...