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dc.contributor.authorGabrielsen, Tommy Staahl
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-26T12:31:41Z
dc.date.available2006-06-26T12:31:41Z
dc.date.issued2003-06
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/165594
dc.description.abstractWe consider a setting where two upstream firms may vertically integrate or contract with a single downstream distributor. Under vertical integration the integrated firm may offer to share the downstream capacity with its upstream rival. Each firm may or may not have a positive outside option by bypassing the existing distributor. We show that the equilibrium never entails vertical integration and all upstream firms will sign vertical contracts with the common distributor. This result contrasts with results from previous literature, suggesting that vertical integration and sharing can be an equilibrium. Implications for welfare are also considered.en
dc.format.extent1940300 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:18en
dc.subjectvertical contractsen
dc.subjectbypassen
dc.subjectvertical integrationen
dc.subjectgas marketsen
dc.titleOn the costs and benefits of vertical integrationen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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