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dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-26T10:53:44Z
dc.date.available2006-06-26T10:53:44Z
dc.date.issued2003-12
dc.identifier.issn1503-2140
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/166496
dc.description.abstractWe analyse how the internal organisation of firms affects the correspondence between private and social incentives for horizontal merger. Applying a model of endogenous merger formation in a three-firm asymmetric Cournot industry, we contrast the cases of entrepreneurial and managerial firms. The use of strategic delegation increases both the probability that a merger takes place and the likelihood that the 'wrong' type of merger is undertaken, from a viewpoint of social welfare. This suggests that managerial delegation increases the scope for antitrust policy.en
dc.format.extent1886667 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSNFen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:1en
dc.subjectmanagerial delegationen
dc.subjectendogenous mergersen
dc.subjectcost asymmetryen
dc.subjectantitrust policyen
dc.titleManagerial delegation and merger incentivesen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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